Offshore Detainees and the Role of Courts After \u3cem\u3eRasul v. Bush\u3c/em\u3e: The Underappreciated Virtues of Deferential Review by Martin, David A
Boston College Third World Law Journal
Volume 25
Issue 1 Immigration Law and Human Rights: Legal
Line Drawing Post-September 11
Article 5
1-1-2005
Offshore Detainees and the Role of Courts After
Rasul v. Bush: The Underappreciated Virtues of
Deferential Review
David A. Martin
University of Virginia School of Law, dam3r@virginia.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/twlj
Part of the National Security Commons
This Symposium Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Boston College Third World Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School.
For more information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
David A. Martin, Offshore Detainees and the Role of Courts After Rasul v. Bush: The Underappreciated
Virtues of Deferential Review, 25 B.C. Third World L.J. 125 (2005),
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/twlj/vol25/iss1/5
125
OFFSHORE DETAINEES AND THE ROLE OF
COURTS AFTER RASUL V. BUSH: THE
UNDERAPPRECIATED VIRTUES OF
DEFERENTIAL REVIEW
David A. Martin*
Abstract: In Rasul v. Bush, the Supreme Court held that federal courts
have jurisdiction over habeas corpus petitions ªled by detainees at the
U.S. naval base at Guantanamo, but was silent on the standards and
procedures to be applied to the petitions, and on whether habeas juris-
diction covers detainees at other foreign locations. To foster application
of habeas at other military sites for longer-term detainees but maintain
military effectiveness against terrorism, this Article sketches a regime for
considering detention challenges that builds on a structure emerging in
the wake of Rasul and its companion case, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld. Such claims
would be heard by military tribunals, subject to narrow and deferential
federal habeas review. Having military tribunals conduct the primary
factªnding honors key military needs while affording procedural safe-
guards. Although such deference might disappoint some advocates, this
approach carries several underappreciated advantages, because of the
real-world dynamics of such review, principally to stimulate better internal
checks and balances. Though deferring to military factªnding, courts
would retain authority to consider de novo the validity of tribunal pro-
cedures, and would remain the ultimate arbiters of the substantive stan-
dards governing “enemy combatant” classiªcations.
Introduction
The Supreme Court struck an important blow for civil liberties
and human rights in its trilogy of enemy combatant decisions an-
nounced on June 28, 2004.1 It rejected the Administration’s remarka-
bly sweeping claims to a unilateral power to detain anyone the execu-
                                                                                                                     
* Warner-Booker Distinguished Professor of International Law and Class of 1963 Re-
search Professor, University of Virginia. The thesis presented here also draws upon some of
the author’s experience as General Counsel to the Immigration and Naturalization Serv-
ice, Department of Justice, 1995–98. The author expresses warm thanks for research assis-
tance provided by Elizabeth Reilly-Hodes and Thomas Wintner.
1 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004);
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004).
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tive branch pronounced an enemy combatant in the war on terror-
ism, a power assertedly beyond the effective review of any court. Nor
did the Court stop with the protection of U.S. citizens who are de-
tained on such grounds. It held squarely that the hundreds of foreign
nationals imprisoned at the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba, are entitled to test the validity of their detention in federal
court, on a petition for the Great Writ of habeas corpus.2
By design, the Guantanamo case, Rasul v. Bush, answered only a
narrow question: whether a district court has jurisdiction over a ha-
beas petition ªled by a detainee at that particular military facility. Ju-
risdiction exists.3 But now what? What precisely will be the standards
for evaluating the validity of the detention? And importantly, will this
decision apply to detainees at dozens of other foreign sites apparently
used by our government for detention—and for interrogation—in the
battle against Al Qaeda? Our nation’s traditional suspicion of un-
checked executive detention authority, reºected in the June 28 cases
and bolstered by both Anglo-American legal history dating to Magna
Carta and international human rights developments,4 argues for
ªnding habeas corpus applicable in those other detention sites. But
arguing against such an application are concerns about real-world
military needs in what will doubtless be a lengthy struggle against
dangerous terrorist foes willing to violate the most elementary hu-
manitarian norms in an effort to kill Americans—or Spaniards, Iraqis,
foreign workers in Iraq, or even Russian school-children. Will judicial
review in a wider range of military detainee cases unduly hinder suc-
cessful defense of the United States and of U.S. values?
                                                                                                                     
2 Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2695–97.
3 Id. at 2692–93.
4 On the Anglo-American tradition, see Daniel John Meador, Habeas Corpus and
Magna Carta: Dualism of Power and Liberty (1966); Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The Most
Important Human Right in the Constitution, 32 B.U. L. Rev. 143 (1952) (describing the right
to habeas corpus protected by U.S. Const., art. 1, § 9, cl. 2); Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2650-52;
Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2696-97. Equivalent rights are protected in many major international
human rights treaties. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted
by the General Assembly Dec. 19, 1966, art. 9(4), 999 U.N.T.S. 171; European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 5(4), Nov. 4, 1950, 213
U.N.T.S. 221, E.T.S. 5; American Convention on Human Rights, arts. 7(6), 25, Nov. 22,
1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970). In a 1987 advisory opinion, the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights emphasized the central importance of habeas corpus
protection and ruled that it may not be suspended in times of emergency. Habeas Corpus
in Emergency Situations (Arts. 27(2) and 7(6) of the American Convention on Human
Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-8/87, paras. 33-40, Jan. 30, 1987, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A)
No. 8 (1987).
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If concern about military imperatives causes the Court to pull up
short on the reach of habeas once we move beyond the unique cir-
cumstances of Guantanamo—where, the Court stated, the United
States exercises “plenary and exclusive jurisdiction,”5 though it lacks
formal sovereignty—then the Rasul case may prove to be of minor
signiªcance. The Defense Department could simply assign future
long-term military detainees to other facilities, under basing agree-
ments that cede a far more limited jurisdiction than did our 1903
treaty with Cuba.6 I hope to avoid such an artiªcial curtailment of the
promise of Rasul, but I also want our military to be wholly effective in
stopping al Qaeda attacks and disrupting terrorist networks. This es-
say represents an effort to bolster an emerging and workable middle
ground, so that meaningful checks and balances will attach for longer-
term U.S. detainees anywhere, but will take a form that adequately
accounts for the realities of a difªcult military struggle. 7
I. Eisentrager
We have encountered a debate of this kind before, one in which
liberty claims were pitted against asserted military necessity. It culmi-
nated in a 1950 Supreme Court precedent that occupied center stage
in the Rasul litigation, Johnson v. Eisentrager.8 That case, which resulted
in a broad ruling against the habeas petitioners, arose against the fol-
lowing background.9 During and immediately after World War II, U.S.
courts had often received habeas corpus petitions ªled by military
detainees. A few of these cases ultimately reached the Supreme Court.
In the currently much-discussed case of Ex parte Quirin, eight Nazi
                                                                                                                     
5 124 S. Ct. at 2693.
6 Agreement Between Cuba and U.S. for Lease of Lands for Coaling Naval Stations,
Feb. 23, 1903, U.S.-Cuba, art. III, T.S. No. 418 [hereinafter Agreement Between Cuba and
U.S.].
7 I deal here only with the question of adequate checks and balances before people
are subjected to lengthy preventive detention, of the kind the Bush administration appar-
ently contemplates for many or most “enemy combatants.” I do not address the use of
military commissions under President Bush’s order of November 13, 2001, to hear crimi-
nal charges against a minority of such detainees, principally for alleged breaches of the
laws of war, and to impose punishments, including capital punishment. Exec. Order, Deten-
tion, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg.
57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001) [hereinafter Exec. Order]. I also do not address the courts’ role in
reviewing conditions of conªnement, including the validity of interrogation techniques.
Some of my discussion, however, would be relevant in assessing a court’s role in either
setting.
8 339 U.S. 763 (1950); see Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2693–99.
9 See Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 776–81.
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saboteurs who came ashore in the United States in 1942 were allowed
to pursue habeas challenges to the unique proceedings before a mili-
tary commission that was trying them for capital offenses against the
law of war.10 Similarly, General Tomoyuki Yamashita obtained Su-
preme Court review in 1946 of his conviction by a military commis-
sion for failure to control the Japanese troops under his command
who committed extensive atrocities in the occupied Philippines.11 In
both instances, the Supreme Court, applying a deferential standard of
review, approved the proceedings and allowed the petitioners to be
executed12—and in both, the quality of the Court’s rulings has drawn
lingering criticism.13 But they are best understood, despite some ob-
scure wording, as rulings on the merits. Habeas corpus petitions were
the vehicles that brought the challenges before Article III courts.
Then came Eisentrager, decided in 1950. Twenty-one German na-
tionals had been convicted in Nanking of war crimes for continuing
military activities in China (in support of Japan) after Germany’s un-
conditional surrender. They were allowed to serve their sentences in
U.S.-occupied Germany, and from there they ªled petitions for ha-
beas corpus in federal district court in Washington, D.C., challenging
the legality of the detention.14 The Supreme Court’s ruling is conven-
tionally understood as holding that habeas jurisdiction did not lie for
enemy aliens in these circumstances.15
The Court, per Justice Jackson, began by noting that nationals of
countries at war with the United States have been allowed access to
our courts in a great many instances.16 Even the Alien Enemies Act of
1798 allowed—and still allows, for it remains on the books—limited
court review of executive internment, which the statute expressly
authorizes for persons who are nationals of a country with which we
are at war.17 Any internee who claims that he or she is not in fact a na-
                                                                                                                     
10 317 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1942). See generally Louis Fisher, Nazi Saboteurs on Trial: A
Military Tribunal and American Law (2003).
11 In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 25–26 (1946).
12 Id. at 23–26; Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 47–48.
13 See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 11, at 127–44, 171–75 (critiquing Quirin); Waldemar A.
Solf, A Response to Telford Taylor’s “Nuremberg and Vietnam: An American Tragedy”, in 4 The
Vietnam War and International Law: The Concluding Phase 421, 439–46 (Richard A.
Falk ed., 1976) (critiquing Yamashita).
14 See 339 U.S. at 765–67.
15 See id. at 776–81.
16 Id. at 770–71.
17 Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 775. The Alien Enemies Act is the one component of the in-
famous Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, enacted as part of President John Adams’ crack-
down on foreign subversion as war with France loomed, that did not draw the condemna-
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tional of a warring nation may have that claim heard in federal court
on habeas.18 Resident enemy aliens, Justice Jackson noted, also retain
qualiªed judicial access to pursue contract, debt and other normal
actions, provided that the particular use of the courts does not ham-
per our war efforts.19 But nonresident aliens have had far fewer rights
to use the judicial forum, especially in time of war.20 Justice Jackson
placed Eisentrager and his co-petitioners on that disfavored side of
the line. Presence in the United States marks a crucial difference, and
these petitioners never had it.21 Quirin is then understandable, be-
cause those petitioners obviously were on American soil at the time of
review by the district court and the Supreme Court.22 Yamashita might
have been a more difªcult precedent to distinguish. But Justice Jack-
son emphasized a point not highlighted in Yamashita: the Philippines
were a U.S. territory at the time of the trial.23 Yamashita therefore en-
joyed habeas access to the courts, including the Supreme Court on
certiorari, as a result of congressional statutes governing the Philip-
pines. “By reason of our sovereignty at that time over these insular
possessions, Yamashita stood much as did Quirin before American
courts.”24 Occupied Germany, where the United States never claimed
sovereignty, was different.
Jackson then enumerated what he regarded as serious practical
problems that would ensue from allowing federal district courts to
review detentions like Eisentrager’s, and concluded that military im-
peratives dictated the prohibition of habeas. For example, the writ of
habeas corpus historically requires the custodian to produce the body
of the petitioner before the court:
To grant the writ to these prisoners might mean that our
army must transport them across the seas for hearing. This
would require allocation of shipping space, guarding per-
sonnel, billeting and rations. It might also require transpor-
                                                                                                                     
tion of the Jeffersonians—nor of history. See David A. Martin, Graduated Application of Con-
stitutional Protections for Aliens: The Real Meaning of Zadvydas v. Davis, 2001 Sup. Ct. Rev. 47,
110 n.164 (2002). The current version of the statute appears at 50 U.S.C. §§ 21–24 (2000).
18 On the availability of habeas to test only whether the detainee actually is a national
of an enemy nation, see, for example, United States ex rel. Hack v. Clark, 159 F.2d 552, 554
(7th Cir. 1947); Ex parte Gilroy, 257 F. 110, 112–13 (S.D.N.Y. 1919).
19 See Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 776.
20 Id.
21 See id. at 780–81.
22 See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 45–46.
23 Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 780.
24 See id.
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tation for whatever witnesses the prisoners desired to call as
well as transportation for those necessary to defend legality
of the sentence.25
Such a procedure would also mean hauling a military commander
into court, diminishing his prestige, “not only with enemies but with
wavering neutrals.” If “the very enemies he is ordered to reduce to
submission” can “call him to account in his own civil courts,” the suit
would “divert his efforts and attention from the military offensive
abroad to the legal defensive at home.”26 Jackson also worried that
“enemy litigiousness” would result in “a conºict between judicial and
military opinion highly comforting to enemies of the United States.”27
And in Jackson’s understanding, the Court could not limit a ruling
sustaining habeas jurisdiction here to the “twilight between war and
peace” that prevailed in 1950. It would also have to apply “during ac-
tive hostilities,” since the writ is “a matter of right.”28
According to the government lawyers litigating the Guantanamo
detainee cases, the key phrase leading to Eisentrager’s rejection of ha-
beas jurisdiction was this (and other kindred references): “these pris-
oners at no relevant time were within any territory over which the
United States is sovereign.”29 Sovereignty is determinative, those law-
yers argued.30 If so, no jurisdiction would obtain in the case of deten-
tion at Guantanamo, because the treaty with Cuba expressly recog-
nizes the continuing “ultimate sovereignty” of Cuba over the territory
occupied by the U.S. military facility—despite its grant to the United
States of “complete jurisdiction and control” for so long as this coun-
try chooses to use the naval base.31
                                                                                                                     
25 Id. at 778–79.
26 Id. at 779.
27 Id.
28 Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 779.
29 Id. at 778.
30 See Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2693.
31 Agreement Between the United States and Cuba, supra note 6, art. III, T.S. No. 418
(recognizing “ultimate sovereignty” but granting the United States “complete jurisdiction
and control” over the leased areas); Treaty of Relations, May 29, 1934, U.S.-Cuba, art. III,
48 Stat. 1682, 1683, T.S. No. 866 (providing that the lease will remain effective so long as
the United States does not abandon the base at Guantanamo).
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II. Rasul v. Bush
A. The Ruling
The D.C. Circuit in Rasul and its companion Guantanamo cases
had agreed with the government, dismissing the habeas petitions be-
cause the petitioners were being held outside U.S. sovereign terri-
tory.32 The petitioners then sought certiorari raising several issues,
including the need to deªne the limits that the due process clause
places on indeªnite detention in these circumstances. But the Su-
preme Court limited its grant of review to the single question of
whether the courts lacked jurisdiction over these cases.33
Six Justices voted to reverse and uphold jurisdiction in habeas
corpus;34 all but one of the six joined in Justice Stevens’ opinion for
the Court.35 That opinion initially emphasized several crucial distinc-
tions between the Guantanamo cases and Eisentrager:
Petitioners in these cases differ from the Eisentrager detainees
in important respects: They are not nationals of countries at
war with the United States, and they deny that they have en-
gaged in or plotted acts of aggression against the United
States; they have never been afforded access to any tribunal,
much less charged with and convicted of wrongdoing; and
for more than two years they have been imprisoned in terri-
tory over which the United States exercises exclusive juris-
diction and control.36
Although Stevens hinted that these differences might well call for a
different ruling on the petitioners’ constitutional entitlement to ha-
                                                                                                                     
32 Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003). The Rasul and Al Odah
cases, both involving habeas petitions on behalf of Guantanamo detainees, were consoli-
dated for decision at both the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court levels, but were known
by different captions in the two settings. After the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Rasul, the Ninth Circuit reached a contrary result and found that it had jurisdiction over
habeas petitions ªled on behalf of detainees at Guantanamo. Gherebi v. Bush, 352 F.3d
1278 (9th Cir. 2003). But no split in the circuits existed at the time the Supreme Court
granted certiorari.
33 See Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 534 (2003) (order granting certiorari).
34 See Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686, 2699 (2004).
35 See id.
36 Id. at 2693. In this passage, Stevens was examining their situation with respect to a
list of six factors expressly enumerated in Justice Jackson’s Eisentrager opinion. Id.; Johnson
v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 777 (1950). Stevens suggested that the presence of all six was
critical to the Court’s disposition of the constitutional question in a manner that disfa-
vored the petitioners.
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beas, he ultimately chose not to resolve that question, basing his rul-
ing for Rasul and his fellow petitioners entirely on the habeas statute
itself, 28 U.S.C. § 2241.37 Eisentrager had barely discussed the statutory
entitlement question because, Stevens wrote, it considered such juris-
diction foreclosed by the recently decided Ahrens v. Clark.38 That case
had held that the petitioner’s physical presence in the judicial district
was a jurisdictional prerequisite to habeas relief.39 In the Rasul major-
ity’s view, this statutory holding in Ahrens had been later overruled.40
Modern doctrine provides that, so long as the court has personal ju-
risdiction over a person with the power to command the prisoner’s
release, the petitioner’s current absence from the judicial district is
not necessarily a fatal jurisdictional defect.41 Because later cases had
“overruled the statutory predicate to Eisentrager’s holding, Eisentrager
plainly does not preclude the exercise of § 2241 jurisdiction over peti-
                                                                                                                     
37 See Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2698–99. The central statutory language pertinent to military
detainee cases is the following:
(a) Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice
thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge within their respective juris-
dictions . . . .
(c) The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless
(1) He is in custody under or by color of the authority of the United States
or is committed for trial before some court thereof; or . . .
(3) He is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States . . . .
28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2000).
38 See Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2694.
39 Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188, 190–91 (1948). The Ahrens petitioners were located in
another district, not outside U.S. territory, but as a dissenting opinion in Ahrens pointed
out, the same jurisdictional holding would a fortiori apply to a petitioner held on foreign
soil. Id. at 209 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
40 124 S. Ct. at 2695 (relying principally on Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky.,
410 U.S. 484 (1973)). Justice Scalia’s dissent sharply disagreed that Braden could be read as
overruling this portion of Ahrens. See id. at 2704.
41 See Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2695 (citing cases exemplifying this evolution). On the same
day as the Rasul decision, however, a differently composed majority persisted in asserting
that a habeas petition must be ªled in the district of conªnement and against the immedi-
ate custodian, provided that the person is in “present physical custody” within the United
States. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711, 2722–23 (2004). A more relaxed rule applies,
permitting ªling in other districts (where service can be made on a proper defendant
somewhere in the chain of command), if the person is detained outside the boundaries of
any judicial district or is not in actual physical custody. In the latter instance, of course, he
must still be under constraints sufªcient to bring the case within the ambit of habeas cor-
pus. See Hensley v. Mun. Court, 411 U.S. 345, 351 (1973). Once a proper ªling is made, the
district court retains jurisdiction even if the government thereafter moves the petitioner to
another district.
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tioners’ claims.”42 Stevens apparently considered this conclusion re-
garding the coverage of the statute as so clearly commanded by the
language that he offered no further explication of that reading.
B. Its Reach
To this point, the Rasul ruling would seem to apply to any persons
detained by U.S. forces anywhere in the world.43 The next section of
the opinion, however, casts some doubt on such a conclusion. That sec-
tion dealt with the government’s argument that even if Eisentrager did
not wholly dictate dismissal of the petitions, the habeas statute should
still be read in light of the well-established principle “that congressional
legislation is presumed not to have extraterritorial application unless
such intent is clearly manifested.”44 Stevens dismissed that claim rather
abruptly. The principle, he noted, has no application when the persons
detained are within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. The
treaty with Cuba gives the United States “complete jurisdiction and
control.” Relying on that treaty language, the Court held in essence
that such an extensive range of ceded territorial authority amounts to
territorial jurisdiction for purposes of applying the government’s prof-
fered canon of construction.45 Stevens went on to assert that applying
habeas in this fashion beyond core national territory is consistent with
the historical reach of the writ.46 Lord Mansªeld, he wrote, recognized
that the writ would extend to any territory:
“under the subjection of the Crown.” Later cases conªrmed
that the reach of the writ depended not on formal notions of
territorial sovereignty, but rather on the practical question of
                                                                                                                     
42 Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2695.
43 See id. at 2698. The penultimate paragraph of the opinion, dealing brieºy with the
other non-habeas claims ªled by the Rasul petitioners, also points in the same direction:
“nothing in Eisentrager or in any of our other cases categorically excludes aliens detained in
military custody outside the United States from the privilege of litigation in U.S. courts.” Id.
(emphasis added, internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
44 Id. at 2696.
45 See id. The government’s argument about the canon suffered signiªcantly from its
inescapable concession that, in view of prior U.S. practice, the habeas statute would afford
jurisdiction over a petition ªled by a U.S. citizen detained on Guantanamo. The Court saw
“little reason to think that Congress intended the geographical coverage of the statute to
vary depending on the detainee’s citizenship.” Id. at 2695.
46 Id. at 2697.
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“the exact extent and nature of the jurisdiction or dominion
exercised in fact by the Crown.”47
Justice Stevens gave no further indication of the criteria to be used in
providing a “practical” assessment of the extent of such dominion.
But his phrasing certainly suggests that there may be U.S. detention
sites beyond the reach of the writ. Such a possibility is bolstered by his
earlier hint that, on a military base that cannot be viewed as function-
ally a part of U.S. territory owing to more limited U.S. authority un-
der the basing treaty, the government’s favored canon might well ap-
ply to block the application of statutory habeas.48 And once habeas
petitions are ªled on behalf of persons detained by U.S. forces, for
instance, at Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan, the government can be
expected to argue forcefully that Rasul applies only to the unique cir-
cumstances of Guantanamo.49
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Rasul may also strengthen the
government’s determination to push such a narrow reading.50 Ken-
nedy did not rely on any ostensible overruling of Ahrens (and implic-
itly of Eisentrager) to ªnd jurisdiction over the Guantanamo petitions.
Instead, he viewed Eisentrager primarily through a separation-of-
powers lens, and on that basis distinguished it. “[T]here is a realm of
political authority over military affairs where the judicial power may
not enter.”51 The detention of the German petitioners in occupied
Germany was the concern of the Commander-in-Chief and Congress,
not of the judiciary.52 But Guantanamo was different. “First, Guan-
tanamo Bay is in every practical respect a United States territory, and
it is one far removed from any hostilities.”53 Second, the detainees:
are being held indeªnitely, and without beneªt of any legal
proceeding to determine their status. . . . Perhaps, where de-
tainees are taken from a zone of hostilities, detention with-
                                                                                                                     
47 Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2697 (citations omitted). Justice Scalia’s dissent took strong ex-
ception to this reading of British practice. See id. at 2708–10 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
48 Id. at 2696.
49 The United States reportedly holds approximately 300 detainees at Bagram, out of
roughly 9000 detained by U.S. military authorities worldwide. See Dana Priest & Joe Ste-
phens, Secret World of U.S. Interrogation: Long History of Tactics in Overseas Prisons is Coming to
Light, Wash. Post, May 11, 2004, at A1.
50 124 S. Ct. at 2699–701 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy was the sixth vote
for reversal, but wrote only for himself.
51 Id. at 2700 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
52 See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
53 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
2005] Offshore Detainees and the Role of Courts 135
out proceedings or trial would be justiªed by military neces-
sity for a matter of weeks; but as the period of detention
stretches from months to years, the case for continued de-
tention to meet military exigencies becomes weaker.54
Justice Kennedy’s opinion, particularly his discussion of the sec-
ond factor, probably reºects more candidly the considerations that
are likely to govern when the Court confronts petitions ªled by de-
tainees at other overseas U.S. bases. Whether the Court will permit
judicial oversight then will depend, I suspect, more on its assessment
of whether such oversight can be reconciled with “military necessity”
or “military exigencies” than on an evaluation of the “extent and na-
ture of the jurisdiction and dominion” exercised by the United States,
as suggested by Justice Stevens.55 Or perhaps Stevens’s language will
be used to describe a ruling that really rests, at bottom, on judgments
about military needs.
But the key point is this: assessing whether judicial review in set-
tings beyond Guantanamo intrudes unduly on military operations
hinges on precisely what courts actually do when they review overseas
military detentions. Three main questions are at issue. What substan-
tive standards will courts apply to determine if detention is valid?
What procedures will they either undertake themselves or insist that
military authorities observe before a person is subjected to lengthy de-
tention? And to what extent will courts take upon themselves the task
of determining the underlying facts? By limiting its grant of certiorari
in Rasul, the Court deliberately deferred its own rulings on those
questions, presumably to allow both the executive branch and the
lower courts—as well as academic commentary, and, should it bestir
itself, Congress—to wrestle ªrst with those issues, now that we know
deªnitively that courts will in some fashion scrutinize the actions of
the authorities at Guantanamo.
In my view, only if the Court judges it reasonably possible to rec-
oncile judicial protection with genuine military needs will it rule that
habeas jurisdiction extends to military detention at other foreign sites
established under basing agreements that are more constrained than
that governing Guantanamo. What follows is my effort to sketch such
a framework, one that effectively holds courts to a limited role in view
of military needs, while still affording signiªcant incentives for those
who run the detention system to honor the rights of detainees and to
                                                                                                                     
54 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
55 See Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2697.
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act promptly to sort the guilty from the innocent—thus providing a
genuine check on improper executive action. The latter is my main
objective, as it apparently was for the Supreme Court in its June tril-
ogy. The point is not to aggrandize the third branch, nor to prolifer-
ate detailed factual investigations into military activities carried out by
federal courts, nor to feed some notion that only courts can ade-
quately determine contested facts. Rather, the point is to use the judi-
cial instrument carefully and cleverly, in order to maximize the
chances that persons wrongfully detained can secure prompt re-
lease—while still allowing amply for the real demands of military
efªcacy. My sketch draws extensively on signals from a companion
case in the June trilogy, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.56
III. Line Drawing for a New Kind of Conºict
A. Justice Jackson as a Starting Point
Justice Jackson’s opinion in Eisentrager provides a good starting
point for thinking about the necessary set of standards, for three rea-
sons. First, although Jackson seems to indicate that foreign detainees
such as the petitioners there have no “standing to demand access to
our courts,”57 and though the holding has been traditionally under-
stood in that jurisdictional fashion, Part IV of his opinion in fact con-
siders the merits of the detainees’ arguments against the validity of
their trials and sentences, albeit according to a limited standard of
review.58 He also emphasized that “the doors of our courts have not
been summarily closed upon these prisoners.”59 Thus, he implicitly
acknowledged that some sort of judicial access, with some form of lim-
ited merits consideration, was not wholly inconsistent with military
                                                                                                                     
56 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004). The Court’s holdings in Hamdi are, strictly speaking, appli-
cable only to U.S. citizens picked up in combat areas and detained as enemy combatants.
So far as is known, to date only Hamdi ªts that description. But the Department of De-
fense, in developing procedures for the foreign-national Guantanamo detainees after Ra-
sul, appears to have drawn signiªcantly on the procedures speciªed in Hamdi. This was a
logical place for the military to look, because Hamdi surely provides a high-water mark for
the kinds of protections the Supreme Court could conceivably decree for the latter detain-
ees. See id. at 2644, 2650–52. For these reasons, in this paper I will often look to the Hamdi
standards as benchmarks, without continually observing that Hamdi is, in the end, poten-
tially distinguishable.
57 339 U.S. 763, 777(1950).
58 See id. at 785–90; Meador, supra note 4, at 41-42; David Glazier, Kangaroo Court or
Competent Tribunal?: Judging the 21st Century Military Commission, 89 Va. L. Rev. 2005, 2072
(2003).
59 339 U.S. at 780.
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effectiveness. The key today, as was the case in 1950, is exactly what
sort of scrutiny accompanies that access.
Second, Jackson himself took great care to place the Eisentrager
controversy in historical context, pointing out several times and with
evident approval that legal rules have been evolving toward according
greater rights to foreign nationals. For example, citing a host of cases
considering the deportation of aliens, Jackson noted that “this Court
has steadily enlarged [an alien’s] right against Executive deportation
except upon full and fair hearing.”60 Quoting the court’s then-recent
decision in ex parte Kawato, he further observed that the “ancient rule
against suits by resident alien enemies has survived only so far as neces-
sary to prevent use of the courts to accomplish a purpose which might
hamper our own war efforts or give aid to the enemy.”61 And lest one
miss the signiªcance of this evolutionary message, the very ªrst sen-
tence of Part I of the opinion had emphasized that theme: “Modern
American law has come a long way since the time when outbreak of
war made every enemy national an outlaw, subject to both public and
private slaughter, cruelty and plunder.”62
To be sure, Justice Jackson then offered a host of reasons, including
the practical difªculties referred to above, why granting the petition-
ers’ speciªc claims would have pushed that evolution too far at that
stage of legal development.63 But he certainly implied that such an
evolution is ongoing. Jackson’s opinion reminds its readers that war
does not represent an absence of legal rules, but merely a time when
a different set of rules is called into play, in order to sustain funda-
mental elements of the rule of law while still allowing for the effective
use of arms.64
If such evolution is a continuing process, then it would not be at
all surprising to ªnd that a more protective regime, albeit one still
carefully crafted to honor military needs, would be appropriate ªfty-
four years later. Fully a quarter of our life as a nation under the Con-
stitution has elapsed since the Court decided Eisentrager—a very sub-
stantial period of time. In the meantime, statutory, constitutional, and
                                                                                                                     
60 Id. at 771 (emphasis added).
61 Id. at 776 (emphasis added) (quoting Ex parte Kawato, 317 U.S. 69, 75 (1942)).
62 Id. at 768–69.
63 Part II of his opinion, which contains the central reasoning for the denial of the pe-
titioners’ access claims, starts by lamenting “how much further we must go if we are to invest
these enemy aliens, resident, captured and imprisoned abroad, with standing to demand
access to our courts.” Id. at 777 (emphasis added).
64 See David A. Martin, Preventive Detention: Immigration Law Lessons for the Enemy Combat-
ant Debate, 18 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 305, 321–23 (2004).
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treaty law have developed signiªcantly in the direction of affording
more protections to criminal defendants and other detainees, includ-
ing signiªcant changes in the military justice system.65
Third, Jackson’s account of practical problems that might result
from habeas jurisdiction, summarized in Part I, highlights the main
functional concerns that still haunt the debate about whether to af-
ford foreign detainees access to U.S. courts. A central question for
today’s Court in considering whether Rasul should apply to U.S. pris-
oners held on bases other than Guantanamo is this: what might the
lapse of those ªfty-four years mean for evaluating afresh the practical
or functional difªculties that contributed to Justice Jackson’s jurisdic-
tional conclusions?
B. Analyzing the Functional Impact of Judicial Review of Military Detention
Jackson expressed concern with the logistics of moving the peti-
tioner and necessary witnesses to the habeas court, as well as the pos-
sibility of distracting and potentially demeaning military commanders
by placing them on the witness stand or second-guessing their judg-
ments.66 To the extent that Jackson’s concern rested on the logistics of
sea transport,67 we are plainly in a different era. Today’s vast, speedy,
and relatively inexpensive air transport network makes transoceanic
movement far less problematic. Further, one could certainly envision
the statutory or regulatory development of a system for judicial review
relying primarily on remote video hookup when live testimony is nec-
essary in cases involving overseas military detainees.68
Far more importantly, modern habeas practice tends to postpone
or downplay the physical production of the prisoner in response to
the writ, as courts strive to the greatest extent possible to resolve the
                                                                                                                     
65 Those relying on Quirin and Eisentrager in shaping their suggestions for our response
to terrorism usually ignore the fact that the law has evolved considerably since that time—
both in providing greater protections for all persons, whether civilian or military, charged
with a crime, and in expanding the protections given prisoners of war. See, e.g., William P.
Barr & Andrew G. McBride, Military Justice for al Qaeda, Wash. Post, Nov. 18, 2001, at B7.
For example, the 1929 Geneva Conventions, operative during the key events in both those
cases, were replaced by the 1949 Conventions, based on lessons learned during World War
II. Glazier, supra note 58, at 2073–84.
66 See Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 778–79.
67 See id. at 779.
68 Cf. Rivera v. Santirocco, 814 F.2d 859, 860 (2d Cir. 1987); United States v. Mandel,
857 F. Supp. 253, 255 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (blessing the use of alternative means to obtain the
testimony of witnesses commanded to appear via habeas corpus ad testiªcandum, such
alternatives including depositions at the place of conªnement or the use of video or audio
technology).
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issues based on legal rulings without the need for a detailed factual
inquiry.69 This element—-the nature of the factual inquiry—furnishes
a central measure for judging the practicality of access to habeas at a
wider range of U.S. detention facilities overseas. If the still-developing
ground rules for such habeas review lend themselves to frequent fac-
tual disputes that can be resolved only by live testimony, then intru-
sion into military operations is inevitably magniªed. If the rules in-
stead permit most cases to be resolved as a matter of law, or solely on
the basis of documents or transcripts generated in the course of mili-
tary routine—albeit military routine reshaped to some extent in view
of the Supreme Court’s rulings—then we will be better positioned to
reconcile judicial access with military necessity.
C. The Importance of Hamdi
The Hamdi decision, handed down the same day as Rasul, con-
tains strong indications that detention doctrine in this new setting will
move in the latter direction, toward a more limited need for
factªnding by the habeas court—although the initial terms of the Su-
preme Court’s remand in Hamdi helped to disguise these indica-
tions.70
Hamdi involved a detainee picked up in a combat area in Af-
ghanistan in late 2001 and then conªned for three months at Guan-
tanamo before the authorities discovered that he held U.S. citizen-
ship. He was then moved to a navy brig at Norfolk, Virginia, for
ongoing detention.71 He never received an opportunity to contest his
designation as an “enemy combatant” (except, perhaps, in the course
of military interrogations whose contents have not been revealed),
and the government fought vigorously to assure that he could not
consult an attorney, even during the course of the habeas proceed-
                                                                                                                     
69 See Meador, supra note 4, at 39–40; Ronald P. Sokol, Handbook of Federal Habeas
Corpus 57–70, 80–82 (1965) (describing the favored practice, as permitted by 28 U.S.C.
§ 2243 (2000), calling for the use of an order to show cause directed to the custodian, to
allow resolution of the petition on legal rulings wherever possible, without having to produce
the body of the detainee); cf. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000). Enacted in 1948, section 2255 created
a procedure to serve as an alternative to habeas corpus for considering the lawfulness of
sentences imposed by federal courts; it expressly provides that “[a] court may entertain and
determine such motion without requiring the production of the prisoner at the hearing.” See
Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1963) (suggesting that section 2255 cases should
be resolved without the petitioner’s presence when possible).
70 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2652 (2004).
71 Id. at 2635–36.
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ings. It asserted that military necessity required such lengthy incom-
municado detention.72 In the lower court decision, the Fourth Circuit
did not doubt that Hamdi, as a citizen, had a right to engage the
court on habeas corpus, but it ruled that the district court’s inquiry
had to be tightly circumscribed, owing to separation-of-powers con-
cerns and the need for courts not to intrude on military decision-
making.73 The district court essentially was instructed to accept with-
out further inquiry the broad factual assertions made in an afªdavit
from a Defense Department ofªcial as to the basis for Hamdi’s im-
prisonment.74 That afªdavit described a version of the facts that the
court deemed legally sufªcient to justify battleªeld-originated deten-
tion.75 Hamdi would have no right either to consult with an attorney
or to be heard in person to contest those assertions.76
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that due process requires
a more ample opportunity for such a detainee, with the assistance of
counsel, to contest the facts allegedly justifying his detention. In
Hamdi itself, the Court remanded under the apparent assumption
that the habeas court would provide the forum for such a contest, and
so undertake its own detailed inquiry into the afªdavit’s assertions,
with a full opportunity for Hamdi to be heard on these factual ques-
tions. Whether further questioning of military personnel could take
place was not resolved; we ªnd in the opinion only general directives
for the lower court to proceed with “caution” and employ “a
factªnding process that is both prudent and incremental.”77
If this were all that the Supreme Court gave us in Hamdi, and if
the Hamdi approach were one day applied to the far wider class of
noncitizen detainees, a modern-day Justice Jackson might well fear
that habeas courts would intrude unduly into military secrets and op-
erations. But the Hamdi plurality seemed at pains to indicate that such
a factual inquiry in the habeas court was meant to be the exception
                                                                                                                     
72 See id. at 2653. In the related case involving Jose Padilla, the government offered a
more detailed explanation of its reasons for wanting to deny access to counsel, in the form
of an afªdavit ªled with the district court in connection with a motion to reconsider that
court’s initial ruling granting such access. See Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 42, 44
(S.D.N.Y. 2003). In the afªdavit, a vice admiral asserted that permitting contact with coun-
sel would interfere with the “psychological pressure” necessary for effective interrogation.
Id. at 46.
73 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 472–77 (4th Cir. 2003), vacated and remanded, 124
S. Ct. 2633 (2004).
74 See id. at 473.
75 See id.
76 See id. at 475.
77 Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2652.
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rather than the rule—necessary here only because a stubborn gov-
ernment had provided no alternative administrative procedure that
met minimum due process standards.78 The opinion amounted to a
broad hint that the government should develop such an administra-
tive process, based on a system of military tribunals, that could be in-
voked fairly early in the period of detention by alleged “enemy com-
batant” detainees.79 The Court then sketched a partial blueprint of
the procedures to be observed to provide due process, apparently
without regard to whether that process is afforded in an administra-
tive or a judicial tribunal.80
D. The Current Process at Guantanamo
Exactly some such administrative procedure appears likely to be
the lasting legacy of Hamdi and Rasul, rather than the prospect of
widespread habeas actions entailing detailed factual inquiries in fed-
eral court. In fact, after those June 2004 rulings, the Defense Depart-
ment swiftly established special “combatant status review tribunals” at
Guantanamo to hear out the evidence presented by both government
and detainee and then to determine whether the prisoner is in fact an
                                                                                                                     
78 See id.
79 Id. at 2651. The Court stated:
There remains the possibility that the standards we have articulated could be
met by an appropriately authorized and properly constituted military tribu-
nal. Indeed, it is notable that military regulations already provide for such
process in related instances, dictating that tribunals be made available to de-
termine the status of enemy detainees who assert prisoner-of-war status under
the Geneva Convention. . . . In the absence of such process, however, a court
that receives a petition for a writ of habeas corpus from an alleged enemy
combatant must itself ensure that the minimum requirements of due process
are achieved.
Id. (citations omitted). It is important to clarify that this would be a far different tribunal
system from the military commissions authorized in President Bush’s November 13, 2001,
Military Order, which are often also referred to as military tribunals. Exec. Order, supra
note 7, at 57,834. The Bush order sets up commissions meant to try charges of criminal
violations and assess criminal penalties, including the death penalty. The Hamdi-inspired
tribunals are meant to provide an administrative forum for deciding whether the detainee
may continue to be held in the preventive detention (similar to that customarily employed
for prisoners of war in more conventional conºicts) that the executive branch apparently
contemplates for most of those detained as “enemy combatants,” both at Guantanamo and
at other U.S.-run foreign facilities. To date, however, these tribunals have been established
only at Guantanamo.
80 Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2651–52.
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enemy combatant and thus subject to continuing detention.81 The
procedures generally seem to follow the outlines set forth in Hamdi,
even though the government could easily have taken the position that
those prescriptions were limited to citizens detained as alleged enemy
combatants and thus were inapplicable to the foreign nationals held
at Guantanamo.82 Some important deviations from the Hamdi outlines
exist, however. For example, detainees at Guantanamo will not have
access to counsel, but instead will be appointed a “personal represen-
tative”—a military ofªcer, who may or may not be an attorney. Addi-
tionally, advocates have raised questions about the neutrality of the
tribunal members.83 The ªrst thirty such review procedures conªrmed
the ongoing detention of twenty-nine prisoners, but the tribunal
ruled that one person was erroneously classiªed and directed his re-
lease.84 Once that procedure was put into place, government lawyers
began to argue that habeas actions should be limited to consideration
of the legal sufªciency of this procedural structure rather than the
accuracy of the tribunals’ ªndings about the detainees’ past activities
that qualiªed them as enemy combatants.85 In this regard, the gov-
ernment can point to abundant case law supporting its position that a
                                                                                                                     
81 John Mintz, Pentagon Sets Hearings for 595 Detainees, Wash. Post, July 8, 2004, at A1;
John Mintz, Four Detainees At Guantanamo to Get Hearings, Wash. Post, July 30, 2004, at A5.
82 See Deputy Secretary of Defense, Memorandum for the Secretary of the
Navy, Order Establishing Combatant Status Review Tribunal 2–4 (2004), available
at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040707review.pdf [hereinafter Tribunal
Memorandum]. More detailed implementation procedures were provided in a later memo-
randum. Enclosure (1), Secretary of the Navy, Implementation of Combatant
Status Review Tribunal Procedures for Enemy Combatants Detained at Guan-
tanamo By Naval Base, Cuba 1–9 (2004), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/
Jul2004/d20040730comb.pdf.
83 See, e.g., Human Rights First, Human Rights First Analyzes DOD’s Combatant
Status Review Tribunals (Aug. 2, 2004), at http://www.humanrightsªrst.org/us_law/
detainees/status_review_080204.htm [hereinafter Human Rights First].
84 Josh White, Suspect Is Freed From Guantanamo: Release Is First Under Tribunals, Wash.
Post, Sept. 9, 2004, at A3. As of early November 2004, 317 such hearings had been held
and 131 decisions issued, still with only the one ruling for release. Carol D. Leonnig &
John Mintz, Judge Says Detainees’ Trials are Unlawful, Wash. Post, Nov. 9, 2004, at A1.
85 See, e.g., Respondents’ Response to Petitions for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Motion
to Dismiss or for Judgment as a Matter of Law and Memorandum in Support at 43–51,
Hicks v. Bush, No. 02-CV-0299, Al Odah v. Bush, No. 02-CV-0828, Habib v. Bush, No. 02-CV-
1130, Kurnaz v. Bush, No. 04-CV-1135, O.K. v. Bush, No. O4-CV-1136, Begg v. Bush, No. 04-
CV-1137, Khalid v. Bush, No. 04-CV-1142, El-Banna v. Bush, No. 04-CV-1144, Gherebi v.
Bush, No. 04-CV-1164, Boumediene v. Bush, No. 04-CV-1166, Anam v. Bush, No. 04-CV-
1194, Almurbati v. Bush, No. 04-CV-1227, Abdah v. Bush, No. 04-CV-1254 (D.D.C. ªled Oct.
4, 2004). Advocates for the detainees are attempting to hold on to a more extensive role
for the federal courts, despite the creation of the combatant status review tribunals. See
Human Rights First, supra note 83.
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habeas court ordinarily has, at best, a tightly constrained role in re-
viewing factual determinations, at least where the detention rests on a
formalized set of administrative ªndings. The court retains an impor-
tant role, but one primarily conªned to considering the adequacy of
the procedures and the validity of the legal standards employed by the
administrative body.86
E. Implications for Establishing the Right Balance—
The Military Side of the Scale
Substantial questions remain about the constitutional adequacy
of the administrative procedure deployed thus far in the Guantanamo
tribunals, and we can expect that such issues will be vigorously liti-
gated via habeas corpus.87 But these difªcult questions—such as the
proper role of the noncitizen detainee’s counsel, the detainee’s access
to key information, especially classiªed information, in order to build
and present his case, and the precise speciªcations for a neutral deci-
sionmaker—should lend themselves to categorical resolution, after a
period of judicial sparring. Within a few years, the general framework
for a constitutionally acceptable administrative procedure should be
settled. Once that has happened, military routine can adjust accord-
ingly—thereby minimizing the diversion of military resources to liti-
gation. If a reªned tribunal system can be made workable at Guan-
tanamo, it should be equally workable in other foreign detention
sites, at least those situated away from the ªeld of active combat.
Justice Jackson, to be sure, worried that recognizing habeas corpus
jurisdiction to challenge any foreign-soil detention by the military
would require us to allow litigation in all sites, even in the midst of ac-
tive combat, because the writ is “a matter of right.”88 Jackson’s rather
rigid and categorical views about the availability of habeas corpus, how-
ever, have not prevailed.89 Succeeding courts have been quite open to
                                                                                                                     
86 See, e.g., Bakhtriger v. Elwood, 360 F.3d 414, 420–24 (3d Cir. 2004) (summarizing
Supreme Court cases describing the core scope of review required by the Constitution in
habeas corpus cases).
87 See, e.g., Carol D. Leonnig, Charges for Detainees Ordered, Wash. Post, Sept. 21, 2004,
at A2 (describing the major Guantanamo habeas litigation being pursued after the remand
in Rasul).
88 Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 779 (1950).
89 See id. at 777–81. His similarly rigid approach to due process (considering that it either
did not apply or, if applicable, demanded a rather comprehensive set of procedures ap-
proaching that of a judicial trial) has likewise been rejected by the Court in favor of a more
ºexible and contextual approach to deciding what process is due. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424
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procedural variation to suit the precise circumstances of the contested
detention.90 In any event, the Hamdi plurality indicated rather clearly
that it would make accommodation for battleªeld exigencies and
would shield ªeld commanders from the need to incorporate the ways
of the courtroom into their most sensitive ªeld operations.91 It strongly
suggested that “initial captures on the battleªeld need not receive the
process discussed here: that process is due only when the determination
is made to continue to hold those who have been seized.”92 It would be
but a short step from this dictum to a future decision ªnding habeas
jurisdiction inapplicable to immediate battleªeld captures and deten-
tions, but instead available only when the person is placed in some form
of protracted detention away from the battlefront. Drawing that precise
line in a way that fully honors military needs while affording minimally
necessary assurances against lengthy unlawful detention poses a decided
challenge, but workable guidelines should prove possible.93
It is useful to summarize the key elements of what will probably
become a settled system for review of the combatant status of detain-
ees, a system that could readily be applied beyond Guantanamo. To
honor due process, the military provides a system of tribunals that
consider within the ªrst few weeks of a detainee’s arrival at such a fa-
cility whether the case for detention is valid.94 The procedures,
reªned by what could be a lengthy and sharply contested dialogue
                                                                                                                     
U.S. 319 (1976); see Thomas Alexander Aleinikoff, David A. Martin & Hiroshi Moto-
mura, Immigration and Citizenship: Process and Policy 481 (5th ed. 2003).
90 See, e.g., Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 379–82 (1977) (allowing traditional habeas
in an Article III court to be statutorily displaced by a procedure that permitted an Article I
court to resolve the key legal and constitutional issues; the “substitution of a collateral
remedy which is neither inadequate nor ineffective to test the legality of a person’s deten-
tion does not constitute a suspension of the writ of habeas corpus”).
91 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2649.
92 Id. Technically, this passage from Justice O’Connor’s opinion for the plurality notes
only that the parties in Hamdi agreed to this initial insulation of battleªeld captures—but
the discussion strongly suggests that the Court also subscribes to such an approach. Justice
Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Rasul also suggests that such line-drawing is appropriate
to shield battleªeld detentions from judicial inquiry. Id. at 2700 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
93 The issue may not even come up on any signiªcant scale; it seems unlikely that many
battlefront detainees will be in a position to ªle habeas actions, even through “next
friends.” (“Next friends” are persons allowed to act for an otherwise incapable party in
litigation. This practice can be especially important to challenging executive branch de-
tention, because the detainee may not be in a position to ªle court papers. The Hamdi
petition, for example, was ªled by the detainee’s father as next friend. Id. at 2636.)
94 The military is continuing to move new prisoners to Guantanamo—a sign that it
does not consider the tribunal review system adopted in the wake of Rasul to unduly  im-
pede necessary military operations. Nation in Brief, Wash. Post, Sept. 22, 2004, at A12
(reporting the move of ten detainees from Afghanistan to Guantanamo).
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with reviewing courts exercising the authority afªrmed in Rasul, af-
ford a genuine opportunity for the detainee to make his case.95 Mili-
tary ofªcers will be the primary decisionmakers, however, not civilian
judges. These ofªcers will hear the witnesses, consider in detail any
classiªed information, assess its relevance and worth, and provide a
comprehensive statement of reasons for their conclusions. Perhaps
there will also be an appellate body likewise composed of military
ofªcers.96 But it does appear likely that the Supreme Court will re-
main vigilant to assure that the military ofªcers who make the pri-
mary decisions are appropriately insulated from command pressures
so that they can provide an honestly neutral forum. If so, this will par-
allel a hard-fought evolution that has led to similar reforms for the
system of ordinary courts-martial.97 Hamdi expressly rejected a gov-
ernment argument that military interrogation could afford the neces-
sary opportunity for the individual to be heard.98 Repeatedly the plu-
rality opinion emphasized the need for a neutral decisionmaker.
1. Military Ofªcers as Primary Decisionmakers
Even with that important qualiªcation regarding the insulation
of the decisionmakers, the fact that the primary functions will be car-
ried out by military ofªcers offers a major reason why such a system
can operate in a way that takes sufªcient account of military necessity.
Military ofªcers will ªgure prominently in the operation, manage-
ment, and oversight of this process, subject only to the broad outside
superintendence of the courts applying deferential review standards.
Sensitive or classiªed information will be used primarily in the mili-
tary forum, presumably handled by personnel with the appropriate
level of clearance. And the current Guantanamo tribunal system also
provides for the assignment of military ofªcers as representatives for
the detainees—even though the provisions for the ofªcers’ appoint-
ments (including the failure to require that they be military lawyers),
                                                                                                                     
95 Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2696–99.
96 The current procedures allow for only limited review by the Convening Authority.
Tribunal Memorandum, supra note 82, para. h.
97 See Glazier, supra note 58, at 2075–77(describing important reforms pursuant to the
Military Justice Acts of 1968 and 1983, Pub. L. No. 90-632, 82 Stat. 1335 (1968); Pub. L.
No. 98-209, 97 Stat. 1393 (1983)).
98 124 S. Ct. at 2651. Justice O’Connor writes, “An interrogation by one’s captor, how-
ever effective an intelligence-gathering tool, hardly constitutes a constitutionally adequate
factªnding before a neutral decisionmaker.” Id.
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their actual involvement before the tribunal, and the conªdentiality
of client communications still raise serious due process concerns.99
2. The Limited Role for Courts in Factªnding, Once the Military
Tribunal Has Matured
A second crucial feature of this emerging regime, from the
standpoint of assuring adequate observance of military needs, is that
courts will not be authorized to investigate the facts de novo. That
factªnding task falls to the military tribunal. What is less clear is the
exact shape of the deferential review standard that will govern judicial
consideration of a tribunal’s factual ªndings. Fifty years ago the rule
was a virtual hands-off. Yamashita, in a passage quoted with approval in
Eisentrager, announced the following standard of review:
If the military tribunals have lawful authority to hear, decide
and condemn, their action is not subject to judicial review
merely because they have made a wrong decision on disputed
facts. Correction of their errors of decision is not for the
courts but for the military authorities which are alone author-
ized to review their decisions.100
Today’s Supreme Court seems unlikely to honor this extreme ver-
sion of the judicial “passive virtues.”101 Hamdi reversed a Fourth Circuit
ruling that essentially forbade the district court to look behind the fac-
tual assertions of a Defense Department ofªcial, and the plurality
clearly contemplated that the district court would in fact hold detailed
factual proceedings on remand.102 But as noted above, that immediate
result derived primarily from the failure of the government to provide
any sort of neutral forum wherein the detainee could be heard, rather
than from a long-term plan to sustain such an intrusive judicial role.
Once there is a more formalized ªnding after alternative administrative
                                                                                                                     
99 See, e.g., Human Rights First, supra note 83. A properly structured role for military
attorneys possessing high-level security clearances, as representatives for the detainees,
could also help afford a fair system for dealing with classiªed information. A model could
be the role provided by statute for individual counsel drawn from a roster of attorneys
possessing top-secret security clearances in proceedings before the Alien Terrorist Removal
Court. INA §§ 502(e), 504(e)(3)(F), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1552(e), 1554(e)(3)(F) (2000). See Peter
H. Schuck, Commentary, Terrorism Cases Demand New Hybrid Courts, L.A. Times, July 9,
2004, at B13. See generally Martin, supra note 17, at 126–36. Difªcult questions remain about
what role, if any, outside civilian counsel might play.
100 327 U.S. 1, 8 (1946), quoted in Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 786–87 (1950).
101 See Alexander M. Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 40 (1961).
102 124 S. Ct. at 2652.
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procedures that conform to the Hamdi court’s prescriptions, the situa-
tion should be quite different. But it cannot be expected that the stan-
dard of review will then track Yamashita. This Court will rather plainly
preserve some judicial role in considering the validity of the factual
ªndings.103 Numerous habeas cases from other settings employ the
“some evidence” standard of review in dealing with administrative
ªndings of fact.104 That is, courts consider the ªndings in light of the
record established in a formalized administrative proceeding, to satisfy
themselves that “some evidence” supported the factual rulings. The
Hamdi opinion suggests that such a standard of review will come into
play if the military were to set up a tribunal system as the primary forum
for considering claims of invalid detention.105 But though this standard
unmistakably gives a court a greater role in considering the correctness
of the factual conclusions than did Yamashita, it remains highly deferen-
tial, demanding less than the “substantial evidence” standard familiar to
                                                                                                                     
103 In response to a government argument, the plurality wrote:
the position that the courts must forgo any examination of the individual case
and focus exclusively on the legality of the broader detention scheme cannot
be mandated by any reasonable view of separation of powers . . . . Thus, while
we do not question that our due process assessment must pay keen attention
to the particular burdens faced by the Executive in the context of military ac-
tion, it would turn our system of checks and balances on its head to suggest
that a citizen could not make his way to court with a challenge to the factual
basis for his detention by his government, simply because the Executive op-
poses making available such a challenge.
Id. at 2650.
104 See Gerald L. Neuman, The Constitutional Requirement of “Some Evidence,” 25 San
Diego L. Rev. 631, 636–58 (1988) (summarizing the history of usage of the “some evi-
dence” standard).
105 124 S. Ct. at 2651. To be sure, the Court signaled the likely application of the “some
evidence” standard to the suggested military tribunal procedures in a backhanded way in
Hamdi. In the course of rejecting the government’s assertion that that standard should be
applied to evaluate the ex parte DOD afªdavit ªled to justify Hamdi’s conªnement, the
Court said this:
As the Government itself has recognized, we have utilized the “some evi-
dence” standard in the past as a standard of review, not as a standard of proof.
That is, it primarily has been employed by courts in examining an administra-
tive record developed after an adversarial proceeding—one with process at
least of the sort that we today hold is constitutionally mandated in the citizen
enemy-combatant setting. This standard therefore is ill suited to the situation
in which a habeas petitioner has received no prior proceedings before any
tribunal and had no prior opportunity to rebut the Executive’s factual asser-
tions before a neutral decisionmaker.
Id.
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administrative law.106 It certainly does not contemplate de novo
factªnding by a court, but instead asks only that ªndings be measured
against a record compiled in the administrative forum.107 Employing the
“some evidence” standard, courts should rarely, if ever, have occasion to
call commanders or combat personnel to testify, nor should they require
the presence of the alien petitioner to offer live testimony.
3. Judge Wilkinson’s Further Line-Drawing Challenge
In principle, then, this emerging combatant status review tribu-
nal system, even if adjusted to provide more protective procedures for
the detainee, solidly recognizes the primacy of the military role and
avoids most of the practical hindrances on military effectiveness that
Justice Jackson feared. But one other line-drawing issue must be con-
sidered. Systems that seem sound in principle might not work as in-
tended. Here, the stakes are high on both sides. If courts do not in
practice adhere to the limits envisioned for them in this broad model
of the emerging regime, then the model’s compatibility with military
needs might have to be rethought.
This exact concern evidently played a signiªcant role in the
Fourth Circuit’s conclusions in Hamdi—a ruling that barred the dis-
trict court from looking behind the Defense Department afªdavit that
contained the alleged justiªcations for Hamdi’s detention. After the
three-judge appellate panel ruled, petitioners sought a rehearing en
banc. Four judges voted in favor, while eight opposed. Two of the four
wrote at length explaining their reasons for dissenting from the de-
nial of rehearing.108 They particularly argued that a more complete
inquiry was necessary, involving hearing directly from Hamdi in some
fashion, before accepting the government’s word for the circum-
stances of his capture and the reasons for his detention.109 This salvo
prompted Judge Wilkinson, author of the panel opinion, to ªle his
own lengthy opinion concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc
and explaining why he found such deeper inquiry, though tempting,
                                                                                                                     
106 See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1950). The Administrative Pro-
cedure Act provides for “substantial evidence” review at 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (2000); see
Neuman, supra note 104, at 714, 730–32.
107 See Neuman, supra note 104, at 713–17. This article contains a thoughtful and nu-
anced discussion of the “some evidence” standard and the manner in which it should be
applied.
108 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 337 F.3d 335, 357–76 (4th Cir. 2003) (Luttig, J., and Motz, J.,
dissenting) (disagreeing with the denial of rehearing en banc).
109 Id. at 360–68, 371–75.
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ultimately unworkable.110 He acknowledged that his dissenting col-
leagues were suggesting only limited further steps to explore the facts,
far short of what the district court had commanded in its sweeping
discovery orders.111 But he thought it unlikely that any such process
could be managed without inexorably pulling the judiciary too far
into the process:
This desire to have courts wade further and further into the
supervision of armed warfare ignores the undertow of judi-
cial process, the capacity of litigation to draw us into the re-
view of military judgments step by step. . . . My colleague’s
desire for more and more information signals not the end of
a constitutionally intrusive inquiry, but the beginning. To
start down this road of litigating what Hamdi was actually do-
ing among the enemy or to what extent he was aiding the
enemy is to bump right up against the war powers of Articles
I and II. Judges are ill equipped to serve as ªnal and ulti-
mate arbiters of the degree to which litigation should be
permitted to burden foreign military operations. The ingre-
dients essential to military success—its planning, tactics, and
intelligence—are beyond our ken, and the courtroom is a
poor vantage point for the breadth of comprehension that is
required to conduct a military campaign on foreign soil.
Because I think it both unreasonable and unfair to expect
either judges or attorneys to discard a lifetime of honed in-
stinct, I suspect that in time, if the course of the dissent is
followed, the norms of the criminal justice process would
come to govern the review of battleªeld detentions in fed-
eral court. The prospect of such extended litigation would
operate to inhibit our armed forces in taking the steps they
need to win a war. The specter of hindsight in the courtroom
would haunt decision-making in the ªeld.112
Judge Wilkinson sounds a valuable cautionary note, and he does
identify a genuine dynamic—an undertow—that is operative in these
sorts of cases. It is not easy or natural for a human being, even one
wearing judge’s robes and steeped in the judicial ethos, to curb an
understandable instinct to reverse a decision he believes is wrong,
                                                                                                                     
110 Id. at 341–45.
111 Id. at 342–44.
112 Id. at 342–43.
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even if he is told that ultimate factual rightness or wrongness is not his
responsibility. But, as I discuss below, the very existence of that temp-
tation, given the right institutional framework, actually helps to
achieve a better balance between the competing needs of individual
protection and military effectiveness.
Ultimately, I would argue that Judge Wilkinson’s concerns are
overblown. For one thing, to provide a forum for hearing a detainee’s
fundamental claim that he was innocent of any involvement in unlaw-
ful violent acts against U.S. forces or interests—and so was improperly
characterized as an enemy combatant—need not entail review of
planning and tactics, nor of the broad conduct of a military cam-
paign. As the Supreme Court plurality in Hamdi ruled, factual inquir-
ies in these cases are to be “limited to the alleged combatant’s acts,”
and courts are not to “meddle[] . . . in the strategy or conduct of
war.”113 Such factual inquiries, the Court suggested, should normally
be able to proceed by means of documentation already routinely
maintained by the military.114
Second, most of Judge Wilkinson’s objections address a system
wherein primary factual hearings take place before a generalist Arti-
cle III judge—the system anticipated in the early rounds of the Hamdi,
Padilla, and Rasul cases, before the introduction of administrative
combatant status review panels. Even if valid, these objections at best
argue against setting up habeas courts as the principal factªnding
venue. They do not prove that military needs would be disrupted if
the detainee has an individual right to a meaningful hearing in a fact-
ªnding forum operated and managed by the military itself, with only
the general superintendence of the courts.
Perhaps Judge Wilkinson is also concerned that even general su-
perintendence under that framework would inevitably morph into
more intrusive factual inquiry—that a judge’s “lifetime of honed in-
stinct” will result in the transgression of the boundaries that formally
circumscribe the judicial role, and that such boundaries cannot pre-
vent usurpation of the primary factªnding function.115 This conclu-
sion underestimates the capacity of judicial self-discipline, coupled
with appellate correction when necessary, to resist such encroach-
ment, once it becomes clear that the military forum is the primary
factªnder and once administrative procedures have been structured
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so as to provide an adequate opportunity for the individual to be
heard in that setting. For reasons outlined above, Hamdi and Rasul
point us in exactly that salutary direction, though it will certainly re-
quire further dialogue between courts and the executive branch—and
perhaps Congress—before the structure becomes settled.
F. The Other Side of the Scale—The Protection of Rights
By now the reader might be thinking: Fine, the system described
here may afford adequate allowance for military needs. But does it do
enough to protect the rights of the individual? Certainly advocates
have continued to argue for a much more ambitious judicial role.116
To assess the real prospects for adequate protection of rights un-
der the regime sketched here, it is useful to disaggregate the kinds of
claims that are at issue:117
1. The tribunals, it is asserted, afford inadequate procedures
to protect the individuals involved. For example, advo-
cates argue that detainees deserve more ample rights to
counsel, better access to the evidence used against them,
placement of the burden of proof on the government,
and wider possibilities to call or cross-examine witnesses.
2. The developing administrative forum allows the military
to apply improper substantive standards in deciding
whether the individual’s past acts justify his preventive de-
tention as an “enemy combatant.”
3. Military tribunals are inherently skewed toward upholding
the detention and cannot be counted on to assess the facts
in a balanced manner that is fair to the detainee. The def-
erential “some evidence” review standard lets decisionmak-
ers get away with systematic bias.
All three points raise unquestionably valid concerns. But examining
them one by one reveals how much the courts will remain involved in
assuring individual protections under a reªned tribunal system.
                                                                                                                     
116 See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, Background Brieªng: Making Sense of the
Guantanamo Bay Tribunals, (Aug. 16, 2004), available at http://hrw.org/english/docs/
2004/08/16/usdom9235.htm [hereinafter Human Rights Watch Brieªng]; Adam Liptak,
In First Rulings, Military Tribunals Uphold Detentions of 4, N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 2004, at A11.
117 See, e.g., Human Rights First, supra note 83; Human Rights Watch Brieªng, su-
pra note 116.
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1. The Court’s Role in Each Domain
With regard to the ªrst set of claims, a military tribunal-based re-
gime still gives the courts a highly signiªcant role in considering the
adequacy of the procedures. Nothing in Hamdi (which, as indicated,
actually sketches its own mini-code of procedure, applicable at least in
cases involving U.S. citizen detainees), nor in the broad body of proce-
dural due process jurisprudence, suggests a deferential standard of re-
view when the court is considering the procedural structure applicable
in the administrative forum. For example, if the Eldridge calculus calls
for a wider role for the detainee’s counsel in examining and cross-
examining witnesses before the tribunals, then a habeas court is fully
positioned to remand for a new hearing that honors that right.118 Of
course, advocates may disagree with the Supreme Court’s calculations
under Eldridge and conclude that the balance should be cast more
strongly in the individual’s direction.119 But that complaint amounts to
a substantive disagreement over the application of due process doctrine.
Making habeas courts the primary factªnders or ratcheting up the level
of scrutiny for factual conclusions would not change the situation.
Courts still have the last word with regard to delineating and policing
the minimum procedural requirements that satisfy the Constitution.
Similar observations apply with regard to the second claim. It is
of course vital that any substantive legal standards leading to
indeªnite detention be fully authorized—a question of both adoption
by proper authorities and consistency with the Constitution. The rule
of law also requires that such standards be clearly spelled out. It is
truly remarkable that before June, 2004, the Administration had re-
lied so heavily on the notion of “enemy combatant” as a foundation
                                                                                                                     
118 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (setting up a three-part balancing
test that is now regularly used to assess the adequacy of procedures under the due process
clause). The Hamdi plurality employed this methodology at length in reaching its conclu-
sions about what due process requires in that speciªc enemy combatant context. See 124 S.
Ct. at 2646–48.
119 See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, U.S.: Review Panels No Fix for Guantanamo,
( July 27, 2004), at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/07/27/usdom9135.htm. Some
have criticized the combatant status review panel arrangements for presuming that a de-
tainee is an enemy combatant and effectively placing the burden of proof on the detainee.
Id. This element of the procedure, however, seems rather clearly based on the plurality’s
dictum in Hamdi, issued in the course of its Eldridge-based due process discussion, stating
that “the Constitution would not be offended by a presumption in favor of the govern-
ment’s evidence.” 124 S. Ct. at 2649. It bears noting, however, that the plurality, in sharp
contrast to the Fourth Circuit, insisted that the presumption be rebuttable and that the
procedures afford a genuine opportunity for the detainee to be heard in that process. See
id.
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for the most sweeping unilateral executive powers, and yet gave the
public so little enlightenment on precisely what standards or criteria
govern whether a particular individual falls within the category. In
Hamdi, the Supreme Court itself expressed consternation at the gov-
ernment’s stinginess in elucidating the concept.120 But so long as ha-
beas courts are in the business of entertaining petitions from detain-
ees, as they clearly will be in the emerging habeas regime, that very
review process forces the government, in the ªrst place, to articulate
its legal standards with clarity. Thereafter, the courts will clearly be
involved in reviewing, reªning, and sometimes rejecting such legal
articulations. Habeas courts do not require de novo factªnding pow-
ers in order to play this wholly salutary role with regard to legal stan-
dards. Well-established habeas doctrine decrees that the courts have
full authority to consider questions of law in response to petitions
challenging executive detention.121 To be sure, many difªcult legal
and conceptual issues must still be resolved in developing workable
substantive standards to sort lawful belligerents from unlawful com-
batants (and from mere civilians) in the struggle against terrorism.
But under the regime that is developing in the wake of Hamdi and
Rasul, the courts will be full players in that process—that is, if habeas
review is ultimately ruled to apply to longer-term U.S. detainees in
foreign facilities beyond Guantanamo.
This leaves us with the third point, which poses the biggest chal-
lenge in this realm. The individual rights concern may be elaborated
upon as follows: A military panel might well be held to honor court-
approved procedures (such as those governing a detainee’s access to
evidence, assistance of counsel, and burden of proof) and to describe
its conclusions in terms that match a judicially prescribed substantive
standard for continuing detention. And yet the individual still might
not be given a fair shake if the panel is institutionally biased toward
afªrming what will obviously be a prior military decision to detain.
How can a court possibly identify mere pretextual compliance with
the appropriate procedures and substantive standards unless it is
authorized to take a deeper look at the rightness or wrongness of the
                                                                                                                     
120 124 S. Ct. at 2639 (“There is some debate as to the proper scope of this term, and
the Government has never provided any court with the full criteria that it uses in classify-
ing individuals as such.”).
121 This authority was recently and emphatically reafªrmed in INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S.
289, 300–03 (2001).
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panel’s factual conclusions? Ostensibly, such an inquiry is what both
the Yamashita and the “some evidence” review frameworks forbid.122
This line of argument certainly carries weight. And yet, as we have
seen, it is exactly when habeas courts are broadly authorized to conduct
their own factual inquiry that the process most seriously risks intruding
on or hampering necessary military operations. If judicial authority to
engage in separate factªnding must be part of the judicial access pack-
age, then the Supreme Court will be far less likely to extend the reach of
habeas to foreign-national detainees in sites other than Guantanamo.
2. Real-World Effects on the Administration of Even a Deferential
Standard of Review
a. Initial Responses
Upon closer analysis, however, there are two worthwhile responses
to this concern. First, as noted above, the Supreme Court seems likely
to insist on other structural or procedural guarantees of the neutrality
of the decisionmaker, even though that person can be a military
ofªcer.123 Insulating the hearing ofªcer from the base commander’s
authority, or requiring appellate review by a wholly separate and spe-
cialist appellate unit, are possible steps that reviewing courts could re-
quire. Structures and procedures can be evaluated fully by the review-
ing court without directly evaluating the rightness or wrongness of the
factual conclusions.
Second, those who harbor this concern see the review process in
overly formalistic terms. We must instead consider exactly how such a
process, even with a highly deferential standard governing factual re-
view, operates in actual practice, and we must see it from the differing
standpoints of the key players involved. While detainees’ advocates may
feel that they are greatly disadvantaged by the court’s inability to probe
factual ªndings, the other players will have a considerably different
perspective on the actual reach of the court’s writ.
For administrative ofªcers, including both those in charge of ini-
tial detention decisions and those who serve on the review tribunals,
the single most important fact is that the federal courts have a review role at
all—whatever the precise formal constraints on that role may be. Such
                                                                                                                     
122 But see Neuman, supra note 104, at 633–36 (thoughtfully defending a version of the
signiªcant, though deferential, review authority that a court should exert when applying
the “some evidence” standard).
123 See supra Part III.E.
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a role is now solidly entrenched for detainees at Guantanamo, and ap-
parently for U.S. citizen detainees anywhere in the world; I argue here
for extending that entrenchment to longer-term alien detainees at
other overseas facilities. In such a setting, anything the administering
authorities do is at least potentially subject to being called into question
before a federal judge. This exposure provides signiªcant inducements
for greater rigor in the internal processes that lead to initial detention
decisions, and in decisions to continue detention—especially when
compared to a situation where the administrators know that they can-
not be called to explain their actions in any external forum. The pat-
tern of Defense Department responses to the Supreme Court’s “enemy
combatant” cases illustrates this point. The press reported an acceler-
ated pace of releases from Guantanamo shortly after certiorari was
granted in Rasul.124 More concretely, as noted, within two weeks of the
actual decision in Rasul, the Defense Department began to establish
combatant status review tribunals at Guantanamo, along lines generally
consistent with Hamdi (even though that latter decision was technically
distinguishable).125 Internal review and quality control mechanisms
doubtless existed before, but the prospect of court review gives them
new urgency, polish, and force. Signiªcantly, the mere prospect of
court review greatly enhances the bargaining position of those within
the agency who wish to adopt tighter standards, closer supervision, or
more protective procedures.
The real-world operation of such review magniªes this effect. As
a realistic matter, federal judges, even within the conªnes of a highly
deferential standard, can increase the pressure on the agency in any
case where they sense that the panel has acted questionably or
reached a ruling deeply inconsistent with the evidence presented—
even if there is enough, when it comes time to announce a ªnal deci-
sion in the case, to sustain the ªnal agency determination under the
                                                                                                                     
124 See generally U.S. to Release 140 From Guantanamo; No Time Frame Given for Letting Detain-
ees Go, Wash. Post, Dec. 1, 2003, at A7; Report: Guantánamo Inmates to be Released (NPR radio
broadcast, Dec. 1, 2003), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId
=1525801.
125 See Tribunal Memorandum, supra note 82, at 2–4 (issued July 7, 2004). Well before
the Supreme Court’s ªnal rulings, but after the Court had granted certiorari in Rasul, the
military also instituted another form of review panel, meant to conduct annual reviews of
the cases of Guantanamo prisoners, with an opportunity for the detainee and his country
of nationality to present information bearing on the decision. Apparently the panel was to
judge whether the person could now be released in view of current dangerousness and any
ongoing intelligence value. John Mintz, U.S. Outlines Plan for Detainee Review, Wash. Post,
Mar. 4, 2004, at A10.
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“some evidence” standard. A judge suspecting such a misªre of deci-
sionmaking can, for example, minutely scrutinize the procedures em-
ployed, or ªnd fault with some element of the description of the legal
standard employed. In short, at least some judges will yield to the un-
dertow about which Judge Wilkinson wrote, and ªnd ways to put ad-
ministrative ofªcers through extra hoops while not overtly transgress-
ing the boundaries of the governing deferential standard—at least
until an appellate court calls them back into line.
Most courts, to be sure, will not undertake such a covertly inter-
ventionist role and will honor the prescribed limits on their powers.
But here is the key to understanding administrative reactions to the
presence of review: the administrators cannot know when they make
an initial decision to put someone into longer-term detention, or
when they conduct a formal review proceeding before a military tri-
bunal, exactly which cases might run into a judicial buzz saw. This ine-
luctable uncertainty provides an ongoing external incentive for the
administrators to set up the administrative system in as professional
and careful a manner as possible, and to conduct each case with close
attention to fairness, in order to avoid tempting a court into quietly
pressing the boundaries of judicial deference and adopting, de facto,
a more intrusive review process.
Even a deferential standard of review, then, creates an external
force for serious internal checks and balances, an outside factor that
also strengthens the hand of the inside players who push for better in-
dividual protections and closer internal review and monitoring. This
dynamic signiªcantly increases the odds of avoiding factually erroneous
outcomes, as compared with a system that has no such external spur.
Undeniably, it still falls short of guaranteeing against individual injus-
tice worked by a biased or lazy or inattentive decisionmaker. It must be
acknowledged, of course, that arming the reviewing court with a highly
demanding standard of review would catch and correct a few more
wrongful outcomes that evade the internal checks and balances than
does a deferential standard. But the point here is that a deferential
standard moves us a good deal further in the direction of accuracy than
is ordinarily credited, precisely because of the interplay that will regu-
larly occur between judges and the military. We may need to accept the
remaining divergences as the price of assuring that the system does not
intrude too far on military effectiveness in the struggle against terrorist
forces.
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b. Illustrations
An example of the dynamic described here can be found in a
roughly analogous situation that arose in 1999–2000. Several provi-
sions of U.S. immigration laws and regulations formally permit the
use of secret evidence, unshared with the individual alien, in removal
proceedings or in adjudication of beneªt applications. Supreme
Court jurisprudence and several lower court rulings have approved
such a practice in at least some of those settings, providing, at most,
for highly deferential review, owing to the potential national security
sensitivity of classiªed information.126 Though such use of classiªed
evidence has not been frequent, any such case obviously raises pro-
found questions of fairness to the individual. In 1999–2000, a cluster
of judicial and administrative rulings found serious fault with the
agency’s use of such evidence.127 In some instances, under judicial
pressure, the Department of Justice backed off from plans to use the
evidence, or even to pursue deportation, belatedly discovering weak-
nesses in the information.128 Though many of the key judicial actions
were not yet ªnal, even at the district court stage, and even though
the government retained reasonable prospects for eventually over-
turning the adverse decisions on appeal, this ºurry of judicial activity
and attendant press coverage prompted signiªcant and much-needed
changes in internal Justice Department procedures. The changes
were meant to provide better internal assurance that use of classiªed
information in immigration cases would be approved only when
clearly necessary and only when the evidence had been closely con-
sidered for reliability in a forum other than the originating intelli-
gence agency. The new mechanism was built around close internal
review of the evidence by the Deputy Attorney General’s ofªce, thus
elevating decisions on whether to use such evidence to the level of the
Department’s second-highest ofªcial.129
This internal restructuring should be seen as a highly salutary
outcome, both providing better protection for individuals facing de-
                                                                                                                     
126 See Aleinikoff, Martin & Motomura, supra note 89, at 1267–79.
127 See, e.g., Kiareldeen v. Reno, 71 F. Supp. 2d 402, 407–414 (D.N.J. 1999); Al Najjar v.
Reno, 97 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1349–60 (S.D. Fla. 2000).
128 See Alien Held on Secret Evidence Released from Detention, 76 Interpreter Releases
1713, 1719 (Dec. 3, 1999).
129 See House Holds Hearings on Use of Secret Evidence, Visa Waiver Pilot Program, 77 Inter-
preter Releases 301, 303 (2000); Niels W. Frenzen National Security and Procedural Fair-
ness: Secret Evidence and the Immigration Laws, 76 Interpreter Releases 1677, 1683–84
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portation charges (because such evidence will be used less frequently
and only after its reliability has been subjected to additional and more
dispassionate review), and yet still shielding truly valid classiªed in-
formation and permitting action in response. The Department of Jus-
tice is in a far better position than are generalist judges to evaluate
such information, both for its centrality to the case and for its back-
ground reliability. This more disciplined internal review continued
even after the principal district court rulings that catalyzed it were
either vacated on appeal or sharply criticized by an appellate court in
ancillary proceedings.130 A similar healthy interplay with the military’s
internal systems for enemy combatant detention decisions may well
result from Rasul.
The immigration ªeld provides a second illustration of the inter-
nal impact of judicial review, even when review standards are, in prin-
ciple, highly deferential. Immigration law is notorious for such defer-
ence. Law reviews for decades have been ªlled with articles critical of
standards of review requiring courts to defer to the so-called plenary
power of the political branches in immigration cases or recognizing
broad discretion in the immigration agencies.131 Immigration attor-
neys and advocates likewise bemoan the sweeping authority given to
immigration agencies, illustrating their complaints with cases (often
their own unsuccessful litigation) that have upheld questionable
agency action.
But if one talks to government attorneys in immigration agencies,
or ªeld operations personnel, or indeed to immigration judges or
members of the Board of Immigration Appeals, one gets a very differ-
ent perspective. One ªnds no reveling in plenary powers, no broad
sense that government actors have wide license to do as they please
because courts will defer. Their attitude is the opposite—a mirror im-
age. Like advocates, they tend to remember most vividly the cases that
they lost—or at least instances where district or appellate court judges
                                                                                                                     
130 The original secret evidence ruling in Kiareldeen was not appealed because the INS
decided to drop its deportation efforts. But the Third Circuit later reversed the district
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the district court’s initial secret evidence rulings. Kiareldeen v. Ashcroft, 273 F.3d 542, 552–
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engaged in what was perceived as highly demanding discovery or
other scrutiny, or decreed remands on the basis of minute problems
of procedure or articulation. They sense that judges could at any time,
with virtually any of their actions, repeat such close scrutiny or negate
what they decide, particularly if the initial decisionmaker does not act
carefully and support the decisions with solid reasoning. Although the
vast majority of an agency’s day-to-day decisions will not lead to judi-
cial review, and even though the immigration agencies in fact prevail
in a solid majority of cases that do get to court, adverse litigation ex-
periences (even if overturned on appeal) play a signiªcant role in
shaping future agency action. They thus help to instill a better inter-
nal discipline and to strengthen the hand of those within the agency
who favor more careful or more protective procedures.
c. The Paradox
My argument for the value of deferential review, it must be ac-
knowledged, rests at least in part on paradox. In the military detainee
context, the argument presumes that we need a standard so accom-
modating to military needs that appellate courts will often be called
on to rein in district courts when they give vent to a natural instinct to
reach the merits and overturn administrative ªndings they simply feel
to be erroneous. But at the same time, a portion of the stimulus for
the military to develop and sustain the right kind of administrative
process, with serious internal checks and balances, depends at least in
part on the military’s risk, in any given case, of encountering a cow-
boy district judge whose intrusions are supposedly precluded by the
deferential standards that are to govern review. It is hardly a tidy sys-
tem. But tidiness is not the objective. This precise dynamic, based on
uncertainty about what federal judges might do once Rasul made it
clear that Guantanamo detainees could bring habeas actions, has al-
ready triggered signiªcant internal changes. It spawned the creation
of a systematic review process at Guantanamo run by the military, one
that has resulted in the release of at least one wrongfully detained in-
dividual. And this occurred though no court (as yet) either ordered
the creation of that system or spelled out its procedures or standards.
The sole ostensible motivation for the elaboration of the administra-
tive tribunal system was simply the knowledge that habeas review of
some kind would occur.
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Conclusion: Acoustic Separation That Helps Achieve the
Needed Balance
In sum, deferential standards of review give rise to a salutary
form of acoustic separation132 that actually bolsters a delicate but in-
dispensable balance when the strongest of governmental needs con-
ºicts with the most elemental of individual liberty claims. Preventive
detention of alleged enemy combatants in the struggle against terror-
ism is exactly such an arena.
Acoustic separation in this setting can be understood as follows.
Individual detainees and their family members and attorneys, consid-
ering what is billed as a deferential standard of review, will likely focus on
the word deferential, hearing daunting strains that may deter most
ªlings—at least in the absence of what they believe to be a strong case
for proving military injustice. Such a message minimizes intrusions on
the operations of the military and encourages advocates to be more
selective in the cases they bring. At the same time, however, the
ofªcers who are the designers and stewards of the detention system
are far more likely to focus primarily on the word review. Once review
exists, all actors know that courts will be looking over their shoulders.
Every single case thus holds the potential for triggering uncomfort-
able judicial intrusions, especially if the administrators do not do their
best to provide internally for high-quality and balanced decisions.
In the end, these underappreciated virtues of the emerging Ra-
sul/Hamdi framework mean that it can make fully adequate room for
genuine military needs while affording real, albeit imperfect, protec-
tion for individuals against military overreaching. This regime deserves
to be applied to longer-term U.S. detainees elsewhere in the world.
                                                                                                                     
132 This metaphor was ªrst introduced into the legal discourse, so far as I know, by
Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: on Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97
Harv. L. Rev. 625 (1984). I employ the concept here in a related but slightly different fash-
ion from the framework used in that article.
